And the alleged compensation for Crimea – 10 years of gas supplies seems to be inadequately modest. But one day he nevertheless admitted: there was a conversation about Crimea. And it is difficult to accept this tradition on faith. Did Russia have the opportunity to get out from the wreckage of the empire with less losses 30 years ago, on December 8, 1991, the leaders of the three “fraternal” republics – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus – told the hail and the world that “the USSR as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality ceases to exist.” All these 30 years, the debate about whether the USSR had a chance to “stay alive” has not ceased. ), can we take Crimea for the fact that we will give free gas to Ukraine for ten years. Yeltsin began to reason … Well, here is Crimea, 1954. As early as August 24, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the republic decided to transfer all military formations located on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR under its jurisdiction. Maybe, he says, it is necessary to restore, as it were, justice and order … I replied that there was no gift. The interest in this topic is understandable. Better known as the Budapest Memorandum. From left to right: Leonid Kravchuk, Stanislav Shushkevich, Boris Yeltsin after the signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS. – it would be less. Kravchuk himself calls the words of Khrushchev Jr. According to the assurances, for example, of Sergei Khrushchev, the son of Nikita Khrushchev, who passed away for two years, Crimea was not given to Ukraine by his father, but by Yeltsin. It is not a fact, of course, that it would be absolutely comfortable for us. But in 1994, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Great Britain and the United States signed a Memorandum of Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. a “phony letter”, categorically denying the fact of such a conversation with Yeltsin: “Crimea was already a part of Ukraine. Khrushchev gave it to Ukraine. Incidentally, Ukraine is significantly ahead of Russia in the field of army construction. Mikhail Nikiforovich, known for his “tender” attitude towards the first President of Russia (he entered the anti-Yeltsin camp in the mid-1990s), cannot act as an uninterested witness. – He asked Yeltsin: “Boris Nikolayevich, what about the Crimea?” And Yeltsin was looking at the table, glasses were already being placed there … He said: “Yes, take it yourself!” Well, he took it. Many people said and continue to say that Yeltsin at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union could have demanded a “payoff” in the form of Crimea from Ukraine – and he would certainly have received what he wanted. Including with regard to our relations with the “brothers-Slavs.” The probability that, having presented claims to Crimea for 30 years, Russia would have achieved the desired result, is far from one hundred percent. “ In most of his interviews, Kravchuk claims that the Crimean issue was not raised at all during the Bialowieza negotiations. True, Yeltsin himself started it, according to Kravchuk: “When we were considering the agreement on the formation of the CIS, the question of nuclear weapons and Crimea arose. And not only because of ethical considerations. What could Russia oppose to Ukrainian “obstinacy”? According to this document, Ukraine undertook to remove all nuclear weapons from its territory “on time” (in fact, the warheads were moved to Russian territory). This process was stopped precisely by the Belovezhsky agreements. And the forces that were at the disposal of the Russian leadership in the fall-winter of 1991 were not even enough to suppress the Dudayev rebellion in Chechnya. “I read in the memoirs of Kravchuk (the first president of Ukraine. One Russian autonomy after another announced its state sovereignty and thus acquired the status of a union republic. Moreover, they were at that time in the operational subordination of the General Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS. Истoчник www.mk.ru ” But again, there is no evidence of this. But even this formulation of the question presupposes a kind of deal: “Return – not that …” And what is “not that”? ” “ It was a very good deal, ”continues Poltoranin. On the other hand, the likelihood that Ukraine with such a development of events would be a nuclear power today is very high. Especially considering that in those years the prices for blue fuel supplied to the CIS countries were compared to today's junk ones. Obviously, forceful arguments could not figure here. ” However, it is not known in what such Kravchukov memoirs Khrushchev Jr. This, of course, is primarily about the Crimea. Petersburg, we will transfer this fleet there, and that's all. If the peninsula had already become ours back then, in 1991, we would have found ourselves today in a completely different geopolitical reality. In addition, the delay in the dissolution of the Union could sideline Russia itself, which also began to crawl at the seams. How can you give a second time? And that's pretty hard to argue with. And on December 6, 1991, the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was approved by the relevant law. Belovezhskaya Pushcha, Viskuli, Belarus, December 8, 1991. ) that when they all met in Belovezhskaya Pushcha and had already agreed on the termination of the Union Treaty and division, his cats were scratching his soul: what about Crimea? And I said to Yeltsin: let's not consider the issue of transferring Crimea now … We just agreed that we will create the CIS, start living and then we will consider the borders, everything according to the law, in accordance with international norms. None of the well-known books published under the signature of Leonid Makarovich has anything like this. We have free piers in St. The Russian Federation simply did not have an army at that time: the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were created – by Yeltsin's decree – only on March 6, 1992. In any case, Ukraine seceded from the USSR: Kravchuk, who had just been elected president, categorically refused to sign the Union Treaty, no matter what form it took. However, in our country, the discussion is gradually shifting to another plane: did Russia have the opportunity to get out from the wreckage of the empire with less losses? Recall that at the time of the collapse of the USSR, this republic was in third place in the world – after the United States and Russia – in terms of the number of nuclear warheads. Let's approach the subject from the other side: what would happen if Russia, represented by Yeltsin, really demanded then, in December 1991, the return of Crimea? ” , in 1992 – Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation). – Yeltsin did not want to. In a word, everything worked out, if not in the best way for us, then much better than it could have been. Yeltsin agreed. – A.K. In turn, other signatory countries pledged to “respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine,” as well as “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.” Today's Ukrainian political elite is practically unanimously asserts that if Ukraine had not signed then the “Budapest paper” and had not renounced nuclear weapons, Crimea would still be theirs, not ours. On the contrary, Ukraine has taken on a huge burden … Ukraine helped to restore the economy of the Crimea, making it a recreation center. But at least one headache – and what! A.K. According to Poltoranin, he asked the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev “to ventilate your guys (that is, the Ukrainian authorities. Tatarstan, the leader of the all-Russian competition for “swallowing sovereignty”, tried, however, to squeeze through the closing door: on December 26, 1991, the Republic's Supreme Soviet announced its entry into the Commonwealth of Independent States “as a founder.” But it was too late. However, this would not have affected Ukraine's behavior in any way. – said Sergey Nikitovich. He says: “Why don't we need this Crimea, why don't we need this Sevastopol! The only possible political counter-argument would be Russia's refusal to sign the Belovezhskaya agreements.